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Model

Slovak Nationalism

Mirage

or

Caroline Barker

In the face

of an increasing number of bloody dissolutions of states around the
and Slovaks has often been cited as

world, the "velvet divorce" between Czechs

evidence that such excesses can be avoided. This article, written before the Octo-

ber 1998 elections that saw the end of the government of Vladimir Meciar, seeks to
explain that the peaceful split of these two nations is not an instance that can be
replicated elsewhere but

grows from

the unique nature of Slovak nationalism. The

of Slovak nationalism and challenges the
has ever been a dominant sentiment in Slovak society. The author ar-

article traces the historical evolution

view that

it

gues that autonomy and democratic freedoms long appeared to be mutually exclusive in the Slovak experience

resignation

and obedience

and

that

it

was

to authority that

the typical Slovak characteristics of

kept them from concerted rebellion.

These same facets lay behind the quiet nature of the

split with the

Czechs

in

Janu-

ary 1993, which was never advocated by the majority of the population.
Frustration of national hopes

done much

to

is

one of the basic features of Slovak history, and has
if one can speak of such a

determine the Slovak "national character,"

—

thing.

Eugen Steiner
The Slovak Dilemma
Silence reigns. Somehow conversation has stalled, even though there are fourteen
people in the room. They are all too lazy to speak and to think. They are content in
their forgetting
in their indolent stagnation. Not even the child's screaming
troubles them. They're content even if it screams
they're content regardless.

—

—

— Bozena

Slancikova-Timrava

"Tapakovci," Tapakovci a Ine Poviedky

In

the aftermath of the

Cold War, the "new world order"

confident anticipation fast revealed itself as an illusion.

groups launched
states that

new

that

was

New

initially hailed

with

conflicts arose, ethnic

or reinvigorated struggles for independence, and a

number of

had long embraced different ethnic groups disintegrated. Nowhere was

this

more apparent than in the new states rising from the ashes of the Soviet Union and its
Communist satellites. Former Yugoslavia was soon to imprint itself on the consciousness of publics around the world as the prime example of these "new" and disconcerting
phenomena. Former Czechoslovakia became another oft-quoted case, an instance of
how two ethnic groups could part ways peacefully. This, it appeared, was the model to
be preached to others.

My

aim here

is to

explain

why

the case of Czechoslovakia

is

a false light in the dark-
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example

that is all too eagerly cited to prove the possibility for easy, peaceful

solutions to the explosive potential of ethnic nationalism. This oversimplistic analysis is
the result of a

ment.

I

number of presumptions made about

the nature of Slovak national senti-

seek to challenge some of these presumptions, arguing that the Slovak case

requires a close examination of the Slovak experience of history, particularly since the

mid-nineteenth century, and an understanding that

this

has

left

the Slovaks with a very

ambiguous, even ambivalent, understanding of themselves as a nation.
this

I

suggest that

has both emerged from and reinforced certain national characteristics that might be

termed resignation, apathy, provincialism, or disillusionment.

1

The Origins of Slovak Nationalism:
Theories and Interpretations
In

The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Anthony Smith distinguishes between theoristswho
phenomenon, according to which "national ties and

see nationalism as a primordial

sentiments are the 'stuff of history,'" and those
the nation as "a product of strictly

who

take a modernist approach, seeing

modern developments

and secular utilitarianism." 2 Whatever

may be

like capitalism, bureaucracy,

the case with other ethnic groups,

but impossible to argue the primordialist line in the case of the Slovaks. This

is

it is all

not to

say that such attempts have not been made.

One Slovak

historian

later,

seeks to build a picture of the long history of Slovak nastress

on the events of 1848 and

these are conveyed in terms of awakening the political consciousness of a national

identity that dates

Mikus

back even as

most strongly

that the

far as the

Great Moravian Empire of the ninth century.

anchor Slovak identity deep within an innate Slovak mentality.

tries to

fines this

ment

who

Joseph Mikus. 3 Although he lays

tional sentiment is

in contrast to the

Czechs

to illustrate the fallacy

He

de-

of any argu-

two peoples are indistinct. In a remarkable statement that reveals his own
and motivations for this primordialist argument, Mikus writes,

nationalist feelings

The Czechs share with
and

sociability.

A

little

the

Germans

peoples on the same footing,

Czechs,

who

a certain lack of perception of political reality

factual detail, not without significance,
is that

which puts these two

they are both beer drinkers. In contrast to the

are a psychologically "Nordic" nation, the Slovaks, facing, so to

speak, towards the

Danube

plain, are

"gens du midi" or southerners: they drink

wine. 4

Mikus contends

that the Slovaks' "centuries-old history proves eloquently that they

also have a natural ambition for such a degree of political independence and statehood
as the general political conditions prevailing in the Central

achieve." 5

The

truth of this statement lies

plies than in the historical ambition of its

more

European area allow them

in the passivity that its latter half

opening words, as

I

to

im-

seek to show.

more moderate approach. He
tends toward a position between modernism and primordialism. Not unlike Mikus,
Kirschbaum believes that the cohesiveness of the Slovak nation owes its historical roots
to the Great Moravian Empire, but only became an active force in the nineteenth cenStanislav Kirschbaum, another Slovak historian, takes a

tury with the rise of the Enlightenment notion of "natural rights" to self-determination.

He

contrasts these natural rights that the Slovaks might claim with the perceived "his-

—

autonomy of many other Central European peoples at the time
rights
which consisted in "the possession of a state at one time or another in the area's history,

toric rights" to

preferably in fairly recent times." 6 However, he also stresses the effects of
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economic

development and industrialization

Second World War

after the

and mobiliz-

in uniting

ing the Slovak people as a cohesive group.

Miroslav Kusy takes a distinctly modernist approach, reflecting Ernest Gcllner's

emphasis on the role of economic development

in creating ethnic

generating ethnic mobilization. Kusy questions

why

cohesiveness and

the Slovak people galvanized in

opposition to their subordination within Czechoslovakia only in the late 1960s, at a

time when the repression was alleviating, not strengthening.
factors at play

were the increased

He

concludes that the key

rate of industrialization in Slovakia

and the resulting

urbanization of the population as a whole. "Just as the process of homogenization of the

Slovaks into a modern nation took place on these foundations, so too did the growth of

nationwide

their national consciousness. Precisely at this time, Slovaks as a truly mass,

group became aware of themselves as a modern nation." 7

So where does

own

the truth lie?

the Slovak people long formed a consciously

"own

language, the sense of belonging to the same family,

historical space,

and a

common

and intellectually"? 8

by

Have

its

aware nation with

Is it

spirit

which has formed

a phenomenon of the

two

last

nationalism

— taking

mass movement
these questions

been

at

such

add one further

— only perceptible

set.

how

Just

any time? Are the Slovaks a nation

a group that

aware of

is itself

its

in

Or

distant history?

the requirement of Liah Greenfeld and others that

to qualify as

I

centuries, recently accentuated

more

industrialization, but with recognizable origins in

[its]

members both morally

its

it

is real

be a truly

Second World War? To

since the

strong has Slovak nationalist sentiment

Walker Connor's

uniqueness? Or do they

fall

tion of an ethnic group, or prenational group, characterized

definition of "nation" as

closer to Connor's defini-

by a "rather low

ethnic solidarity which a segment of the ethnic element feels

level of

when confronted with

foreign element, [a sentiment which] need not be very important politically and

a

comes

closer to xenophobia than to nationalism"? 9
In seeking answers to these questions,
history between 1800 and 1989 that are
nation.

I first

examine those key events

commonly

cited

in

Slovak

by historians of the Slovak

These are the attempted revolution under the Hungarians

in 1848; the

formation

of Czechoslovakia in 1918; the creation of an independent Slovakia under Nazi Ger-

many

in 1938; the

Slovak National Uprising

in 1944; the reconstitution

by the Communist takeover

kia in 1945 followed

in 1948;

of Czechoslova-

and the Prague Spring of

1968.

The

Historical Prism: Reflection or Distortion?

Both Walker Connor and Benedict Anderson
creating and galvanizing national sentiment

stress the

—

power of the

historical

myth

in

the stories of historical homogeneity,

achievement, survival, and greatness, which, whether true or not, can create the mass
sense of belonging that underlies a nation. Kusy notes in an essay, "The Moral Sense of
Historic Truth," that "every

mass

political

movement, every regime, every national or

state

ideology has an existential interest in history:

tion,

wants to make the history of

inheritor

and perpetuator."

He

its

nation

its

it

own,

struggles for historical justifica-

to present itself as its sole lawful

concludes, "In such a case, the issue

at

stake

is far

from

being the scientific resolution of a technical historical question, or solid proof of an
historical truth;

it is

cal self-reflection."

the ideological consciousness of the nation, expressed in

its histori-

10

In reviewing the events in Slovak history enumerated above,
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it is

necessary to exam-
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ine the various

ways

in

which Slovak regimes and the Slovak people have interpreted

them. These differing interpretations are well reflected in the analyses of Joseph Mikus,
Stanislav Kirschbaum,

Eugen

Steiner,

and Miroslav Kusy, on which

I

draw.

It is

only

through understanding the complex intertwining of contradictory experiences and the

ambiguous national value of the various

historical

models on offer

that

one can appreci-

and the ambivalences that

ate the sentiments that directed the course of those events

they engender in retrospect.

1848: Muted Revolution
In 1848 a series of popular uprisings across

Europe was driven by demands for varying

degrees of national autonomy and democratic liberalization. Slovakia had been under
the

yoke of the Hungarian Empire since the tenth century, the nobility were Hungarian,
political class. Kirschbaum writes,

and there was essentially no Slovak

800 years or so of coexistence between the Slovaks and Magyars,
1 790, had not been fundamentally confrontational

In the

tionship, at least until
[the Slovaks]

—

all

.

While

.

no Slovak writer ever questioned

—

the

nobility in Slovakia not only learned to speak Slovak but also identified

with the Slovak core, encouraged

This

.

accepted the medieval order and identified with the Hungarian state

a fact that, until the nineteenth century,

Magyar

their rela-

its

and often defended

culture,

its interests.

11

changed with the Hungarian nineteenth-century policy of assimilating

minorities, inter alia through limiting the use of their languages in public life

its

and focus-

ing education on the Hungarian history and culture. This policy of active assimilation

was known

as Magyarization.

their oppressors, the

Hence,

in the 1840s,

when

the Hungarians rose against

Hapsburg Austrians, a small group of Slovak

nationalists in turn

rose against the Hungarians. Yet the redirection of Slovak loyalties
tially the

Slovak leaders adopted a pan-Slavic policy

Serbs, and Croats,

when

the

which culminated

in a Slav

Czechs pressed for some kind of

in solidarity

Congress

political

this

group

June

1

848

in Prague.

union with the Slovaks, the

rejected the idea, preferring the prospect of direct rule

1848

in

was confused.

allied with the Austrians against the

Ini-

with the Czechs,

But

latter

from Austria. Toward the end of

Hungarians. Yet throughout this

period some Slovak peasants fought with the Hungarian, rather than the Slovak or Austrian, forces.

Kirschbaum estimates that in the most concerted Slovak operation of the period,
September 1848, the volunteer force numbered just 600 men, including students of
other nationalities. 12

Kusy

cites

an estimate of only 300 volunteers, of

in

whom no more

than 50 were Slovaks. In his words, "This spark did not yet ignite the nation ... a few
fires

of discontent on Slovak

—

soil,

a

little tactical

talk

and basically unsuccessful nego-

was done and achieved." 13
Certainly Kirschbaum' s claim that the Slovaks were shown through these events to
be "a nation that would fight for its survival" seems vastly exaggerated. 14 Any nationalist motivations behind the events of 1848-1849 were espoused only by a tiny elite. As
Kirschbaum admits, once feudalism was abolished by the Hungarians (following their
tiation with

Vienna

that

was

all

that

defeat by Austria and Russia and internal reorganization), even those few Slovak peas-

who had been caught up in the spirit of revolution quickly lost interest "and
watched with indifference the victory of absolutism." 15 At most, Slovak engagement,
beyond a few intellectuals, was a class or social phenomenon; in no way was it a naants

tional endeavor.

48

1918: Czechoslovakia: Slovak Goal or Foreign Imposition ?

World War marked

The

First

first

took a hand in determining the fate of their fatherlands. There had been steady and

large-scale emigration

the occasion on

from Slovakia

numbering some 30,000 per

to

which the Czech and Slovak diasporas

Canada and

year, a third of

whom

the United States since the 1870s,

are estimated to have subsequently

Czech and Slovak emigre organizations formulated the

returned. In October 1915,

Cleveland Agreement, which proposed the creation of a federal statecomprising the two

Under
autonomy and
nations.

this

arrangement, both Czechs and Slovaks would have considerable

territorial

independence.

This goal of federation did find support only

Slovak leaders

pressing for a similar arrangement.
tin

among

the diaspora.

The three main

Andrej Hlinka, Milan Hodza, and Milan Stefanfk, were

at the time,

Hodza and Hlinka were both

signatories of the

all

Mar-

Declaration of October 1918, in which cultural and political leaders of Slovakia

signed up to the end of Slovakia's participation in the Hungarian Empire and the begin-

ning of union with the Czech lands. Stefanfk also worked closely with the Czech feder-

Tomas Masaryk and Edvard Benes,

alists,

in finding support for this plan in the

Although Stefanfk and others insisted on an equal role of Slovaks
quiring that the movement's official organization in Paris change

Czech National Council

to the

West.

new state, rename from the

in the
its

Czecho-Slovak National Council, they did not entertain

the idea of Slovak independence.

It

was Stefanfk himself who went

to

persuade the

Slovak League of America to accept the federalist orientation. These efforts

led, in

May

1918, to the signing of the Pittsburgh Pact, which in fact promised a slightly lesser

degree of linguistic and administrative autonomy to the Slovaks than

precursor in

its

Cleveland.

when the federation became a reality at the end of
imposed by the Allies "with the agreement of a handful
of Slovak intellectuals." 16 There was no plebiscite or apparent adoption of the arrangement by the Slovak people. Kusy points out that the one goal of the nationalists since
Regardless of these agreements,

was

the Great War,

it

1848 had been

to gain

essentially

independence from the Hungarians, a negative definition of the

ethnic nation based on a rejection of Hungarian hegemony. Instead of forming a positive definition

in the region

of the ethnic unit as an independent, national

substitute ... the First Republic."

of

its

such as other peoples

state,

were seeking and achieving, "the Slovaks got [and appeared
17

to accept] a

This republic proved a disappointment even to some

Slovak architects, as the promises of national equality

made

Slovaks were

to the

soon forgotten.

With the

birth of the First Republic, the Slovaks achieved participation in a

cratic state for the first time, yet

appeared to do so

at the cost

by comparison with other groups

of their national autonomy. Stefanfk became a national

hero and remains a part of the history of Slovak consciousness to
is lost

first

demo-

in the region, they

this day,

on neither Kusy nor Kirschbaum. Kusy writes, "Somewhere here

national trauma, symbolized in the legend of Stefanfk. This

is

became

an irony that

hidden the

anintegral

element of the Slovak national consciousness." 18

1939-1944: Autonomy and Democracy: Ne'er the Twain Shall Meet?
The perceived loss of national autonomy in the formation of the First Republic was,
those elites

who concerned

cultivated during the First

themselves with

World War and

it,

to the experience

of neighboring nations in

aftermath. Relative to the Slovak experience under the Hungarians, Slovakia

49

for

a loss relative to the hopes and promises
its

had indeed

New England Journal of Public

Policy

However, the Second World War was to take the inverse
democracy and autonomy a step further in the Slovak experience
of history. It is perhaps the most controversial episode in Slovak history and the one
open to the most varied and conflicting interpretations.
Slovakia became a vassal state under Hitler's Germany following an agreement between the Third Reich and the Slovak People's Party in 1938 and a vote in the Slovak
Provincial Assembly on March 14, 1939. The new state was headed by President Jozef
Tiso, an extreme right-wing cleric, with Vojtech Tuka as his prime minister. Tuka appears to have been, by all accounts, the more hard-line of the two, and Kirschbaum
attempts to paint Tiso as a moderate who recognized that "the way to ensure survival
was to have a regime run by fascist parties or by political leaders not unaware of the
gained some limited

rights.

relationship between

interests of Berlin."

19

Kirschbaum acknowledges the tragedy of the deportation of some 70,000 Jews

to

concentration camps, but lays the blame for anti-Semitic policies on Tuka, stating that

"Tiso was personally opposed to such measures but as head of state his position was

complex, reflecting political pressures, and he used his office
it

was

clear

Mikus, who also has personal links
this episode.

He

its

to the

wartime regime,

citizens; but this

human

was the

which he spoke
Slovak-German
ern statesmen

rights of

it

relations with

some of

Of Tiso he

as President of Slovakia with Hitler

who had

is

even more dismissive of

its

individuals or of

some

result of severe external pressures, of forces

majeures rather than any intentional policy."

that

oppose them only when

"During the war, the Slovak Republic was, unfortunately, not

writes,

entirely successful in protecting the

groups of

to

what the consequences of the German Final Solution were." 20 Joseph

writes,

"The acumen with

and handled delicate questions of

German diplomats and

him above

generals puts

the West-

capitulated before 'the Fuehrer' in Munich." 21 This view, for

all

seems rather remarkable, represents a continuing interpretation among a section

of Slovak society today. The Slovak National Party, inthe present coalition government
of Vladimir Me£iar, backed the recent publication of a
that gives a favorable

new

history

book

view of Tiso's regime and Slovakia's wartime

have made other attempts, not

all

for schools

state. Nationalists

successful, to reinstate Tiso as a hero of the nation,

such as renaming streets and erecting memorials.
Miroslav Kusy offers a different view from that of Mikus:
In the final analysis, the

Slovak State played a rather negative role in the formation

of the national consciousness of Slovaks.

and vassal status)

it

Due

was probably incapable of

to its dual nature (both its national

finding a place in the hearts of the

whole nation, since the fulfillment of one function suppressed and excluded the
fulfillment of the other ... In

many

respects, the state therefore substituted any

truly valuable "service to the nation"

was

restricted

by

its

of the inferiority of

with a nationalistic demagogy, and even this

vassal status (part of which required, after

own

its

native to a Protectorate

the recognition

all,

people to the Germans). The price for the Slovak

was probably, even

alter-

in the [Slovak] national consciousness,

too high. 22

Added

to these various interpretations

how

of the independent state

is

further confusion

view the Slovak National Uprising of 1944. The advent of independence
1 939 had appeared to arouse little enthusiasm among the Slovak masses at the time.

over

to

Kirschbaum
time,

who

cites a report

by Peter

in

Pares, the British consul-general to Slovakia at the

wrote,

50

The reception given

to the declaration [of

the people of Bratislava

independence] on Tuesday (March 14] by

was lukewarm indeed. There were no manifestations of joy

and the townsfolk went about their normal business as

if

nothing had happened

.

.

.

A

week after the declaration ... the inhabitants of Bratislava are still unable to
show great enthusiasm for the present state of affairs. The general impression is one

23
of apathy or pessimism.

The French consul-general reported that while the university youth appeared to be regretting the advent of the new totalitarian regime, "the powerless and resigned rural
mass [gave] itself up to its fate." 24
The contrast between this reaction to independence and the extent of popular involvement in the National Uprising is striking. Eugen Steiner captures the mood of the
uprising, albeit in a somewhat exaggerated account. "It was a real 'people's movement.'
Slovak partisans,

soldiers, workers, peasants,

and

chance, went into action virtually without their

intellectuals,

new

was happening and

the people only after they had seen what

wherever they had the

national leaders.

The

joined

latter

realized theycould not stop

25
the course of events."

According

to Steiner, although the formal fighting

army

was

limited to a couple of divi-

had the support of a mawas limited almost entirely to
the rebellion was put down by the Germans over

sions of partisans, usually recruited from

deserters, they

jority of the Slovak population. (In reality, the uprising

Central Slovakia.) Despite the fact that
the course of

two months, Steiner

Politically

identifies

it

as the Slovaks' finest hour:

and morally, the Uprising showed

that the

Slovaks were prepared to

bring the highest sacrifice in order to gain national freedom.
in the troubled history

for the events of
lution, or for

of the nation.

It

was a great moment

the Slovaks had been

blamed

1848 when they turned against the Hungarian anti-Hapsburg revo-

1938 when

Hitler's favors,

However much

their leaders

competed with

their

Czech counterparts

for

whatever Czech democrats and liberals have thought of them, mere

can be no doubt that the Slovaks had shown their real mettle. 26

This

is

a far cry from Kirschbaum's assessment of the uprising.

He

notes that the

leaders of the uprising wished to reconstitute the Czecho-Slovak state on federal lines,

and concludes that "since these groups were dedicated to the destruction of the Slovak
Republic and they enjoyed Allied support, their activities had a direct bearing on the
future of the Slovak people. In linking up with these groups, the Slovaks in opposition
27
to Bratislava were mortgaging the life of the nation."
Kirschbaum seems to merge the terms "nation" and "state" in this observation.
Walker Connor has noted the disservice done to the study of nationalism by such confusions. "This tendency

is

perplexing because

at

one level of consciousness most scholars

are clearly well aware of the vital distinctions between the two concepts." 28 In his ac-

counts leading up to the formation of the Slovak wartime

state,

Kirschbaum does indeed

observe the crucial distinction between the Slovak nation and a Slovak
nificant that once such a state is

phenomenon

—

formed

—

in his

state. It is sig-

view as an overwhelmingly positive

the distinction blurs.

Miroslav Kusy offers the most valuable insight into the complicated ramifications of
the wartime experience for the Slovak psyche: what he terms the "collision between the

Slovak State and the Slovak National Uprising."

He

argues

that,

by

default, the

Slovak

National Uprising was "not just an uprising against Tiso's regime, against his vassal
to the

German

ties

Reich, but [was] also an uprising against the national sovereignty itself

57
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of the Slovak people, against the idea of Slovak statehood as realized in the independent

He

Slovak State."

form

particular

notes the trap of confusingthe notion of Slovak statehood with the

took under Tiso. Since the "idea of Slovak national statehood and the

it

regime of the Slovak State are not one and the same, and one does not represent the
other,
ent,

each enters into the historical national consciousness [of Slovaks] with a differ-

opposing evaluation." 29

Kusy seeks
the events.

to resolve this internal contradiction

He

suggests that the National Uprising

by reassessing the labels attached to
wrongly termed as such. It was an

is

uprising by one part of the nation (in Central Slovakia) against

when

there were

The

transportation.

and was thus,

no German troops
uprising

at best, a

its

government,

at

a time

Slovakia beyond a small number involved in

in

was driven by resentment of the

dictatorial

regime of Tiso,

kind of democratic revolution or social uprising. (Indeed, as

Kirschbaum remarks, the thousands involved

in the uprising

were driven by varying

motivations ranging from political conviction, anti-German feeling, and opportunism to
fear.)

"In short: the Slovak State

was indeed

national, but

Slovak National Uprising was indeed democratic, but

Kusy avoids
less

—

it

wasn't democratic; the

wasn't national." 30 Although

the error of confusing the Slovak nation with the Slovak state, he neverthe-

concludes

that the

it

— more

in line

with Kirschbaum than with his

own

previous statements

Czechoslovak federalist aims of the uprising's leaders made

against the concept of Slovak statehood as

much

it

as against Tiso's regime.

an uprising

The

partisans

rebelled "not only against an undemocratic period and fascist manifestation in this

Slovak

The

State, but also against its very status as national."

significance of the views of these

perspectives and political backgrounds,
they offer of the wartime experience.
their constituencies,

have

in turn

two commentators, who have very

is in

These conflicting viewpoints, which both find

is,

by

in the

Meciar government

state that formed
minds of many Slovaks and is
suggest that anyone who criticizes the

and as the specific

state,

under Tiso. This lack of clarity continues today

government

different

the wide variation in the interpretations

engendered severe problems for the Slovaks' view of

themselves as a nation, as an independent

used by politicians
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in the

to

definition, criticizing the motherland,

therefore a bad Slovak. In this view,

membership

in the

independent Slovakia, and

Slovak nation

is

is

equated both

with membership in the Slovak state and, furthermore, with adherence to

its

present

government.
1945: Paying the Price

Whether one adopts Mikus's view

that

"90 per cent of the population loyallyadhered

the idea of the Slovak State" during the war, or the

to

view that the uprising of 1944 was

the truer manifestation of national sentiment, the reality

is

that federation

was

ulti-

mately imposed on the Slovaks in 1945, rather than chosen by them. Benes had managed to persuade the Allies that his London-based government-in-exile represented both

Czech and Slovak nations. Indeed, the Slovak elite appeared split on this issue,
some advocating continued independence, and others, particularly those behind the

the

uprising, strongly in favor of federation.

What

is

certain

is

that

even those

who

favored

federation wished for equality for the Slovak people within a joint state.
that they

had secured

and others

in

at least this

much through

the

They believed
Kosice Program, agreed with Benes

March of 1945. 32

Nevertheless, as with the interwar union between Czechs and Slovaks, their second
union was dictated by the Western powers. The policy of the (Henry) Stimson Doctrine,

52

had emerged from external aggression or

which advocated nonrecognition of

states that

a violation of international law,

Slovakia with a weak case for continued indepen-

left

dence. Furthermore, since the inclination of the Allies was to reconstitute Czechoslova-

by Benes

kia, as desired

would have made

et al.,

any recognition of the interim sovereignty of Slovakia

very difficult. Given that the Slovak wartime government had not

this

capitulated to the Allies, the

new

federal state

would have looked too much

Czech

like a

occupation of Slovakia.

The

lack of any choice exercised by the Slovak nation in forming the

new

state in

1945, and the denial of their wish for a federal arrangement, meant that the Slovaks did
not embrace the
responsible for
years, the

new

its

state in the

emotional

way

that the

Czechs

did.

Nor

did they feel

subsequent political direction. Over the course of the next three

Communist

grew far more in popularity in the Czech lands than in
Czech lands, the Communist and Socialist parties in Slovakia

Party

Slovakia. Unlike in the

among the people. In the elections of May 1946, the
Czechoslovak Communist Party won 40.17 percent of the vote in the Czech lands, the
did not have majority support

National Socialists were next with 23.6 percent, while the Czech Populist Party gained

20.24 percent and the Social Democrats just 15.58 percent. In Slovakia, by contrast, the

Democratic Party obtained 62 percent and the Slovak Communist Party
cent.

33

Hence, when the Communist Party took over Czechoslovakia

cally-conscious Slovaks immediately perceived
cratic rights.

They saw

ing to Kusy,

felt less

that

the

Communist

it

just 30.37 per-

in 1948, politi-

demoCzech phenomenon and, accord-

as an affront to their national

revolution as a

personal responsibility for the disillusionment anddisappointment

came, with time,

to

Czechs and Slovaks

alike.

1968: Federation or Democratization: The Old Dilemma
Slovaks blamed the Czechs for the start of Communist rule in 1948, the Czechs in
blamed the Slovaks for the failure to attenuate its grip in 1968. Mikus's attempt to
convey the Prague Spring as a period of Slovak leadership and Czech failure lacks credIf the

turn

ibility.

For

all

that

it

was a Slovak, Alexander Dubcek, who

through the liberalization, he was one of the

many Slovak

strongly supported the joint Czechoslovak state.

Mikus

led the Prague

government

leaders and intelligentsia

who

asserts,

This effort of Dubcek to bring closer to the masses might have continued had not

Czech intellectuals tried to outdo him in his liberalization policies. While the
more realistic Slovak Communists were insisting on the federalization of the State,
the Union of Czech Writers, encouraged by Dubcek's initial success, envisioned

the

.

a complete democratization of public

The

reality

life.

.

.
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of 1968, as Kirschbaum points out, was that "the importance of federali-

zation for the Slovaks did not

mean

that they ignored or

opposed the democratization

manifestations." 35 Steiner and

Kusy capture the
autonomy and democracy
led to the choices their leaders made in 1968. Steiner states, "Most Czechs thought that
federation was really all that the Slovaks cared about, which, of course, was not the
case. It was only one of their demands, made more urgent by the fact that in the past
they had so often been cheated of their rights." 36 In the final denouement of the Prague

process. Slovakia indulged in

way

in

all

of

its

which the Slovaks' ambiguous

historical experience of

Spring, the Soviet tanks rolled into Prague as a result of alarm in

Moscow

at

the extent

of liberalization. This opened the era of normalization with the return of hard-line com-

munism, but

also brought to fruition the federalization

observes:

53

demands of

Slovakia.

As Kusy
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The paradox and tragedy of August 1968 lie in the fact that federalization was
brought to the Slovaks by Soviet tanks, that they got it as a "gift" at the expense of

human

democratic socialism with a
events the

if

round

first

time round

(in

1

face. History repeats itself for us very prettily:

848) proceeded as a tragedy, the second time

"independent" Slovak State) they took on the form of a tragicomedy, and

(the

the third time round [the Prague Spring

a pure farce.

is]
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The Czech interpretation of the events of 1968 is one of betrayal by theSlovaks,
they saw as subordinating the aim of democratic liberalization to their nationalist
goal of federalization. From a Slovak perspective it can look rather different. While
liberalization was the sole issue at stake for the Czechs, national rights were an important goal for an increasing number of Slovaks. The relationship between these two aims,
however, was confused. Under the First Republic, the Slovaks had democracy but little
national autonomy and no equality; during the war years they had complete autonomy
but had lost democracy; the uprising of 1944 was a call for democratic reform which,

whom

while

necessarily spelled the end of national independence did not extinguish the

it

hope was again denied by the politicians in
Democracy did not seem to have brought the Slovaks the political
rights they sought, any more than had their experience of independence under Tiso's
puppet regime. So long as democracy and autonomy seemed to be mutually exclusive
alternatives, the former was not an obvious priority in a comparison between the two.
Indeed, the achievement in 1969 of greater autonomy within the Czechoslovak state
appeared to bear dividends for the Slovaks. The 1970s were a period of rapid industrialization and urbanization, with the Slovak economy rising to challenge that of the
Czechs, although the extent to which its benefits were felt in Slovak pockets is questionable. The Slovak masses appeared content with these gains for the time being, or at
least not prepared to fight for anything more. "Slovaks as a nation were at that time still
hope

for

Prague

some

national autonomy; but this

after 1945.

intensely absorbed in themselves, and their cultural aspirations

development of 'national
not on the noun." 38

Kusy

which the main emphasis

focused on the

still

lies

on the epithet and

return below to the question of Slovak acquiescence after 1969.

1

traces a similar trait of self- absorption through the 1980s, observable in a con-

tinuing lack of concern
tional, rights. Little

1989 took place
tions

culture,' in

in

among

the population for civic or democratic, as against na-

wonder then

that the real unraveling of the

Communist regime

in

Prague with the participation of only a few Slovaks. The demonstra-

and celebrations

were genuine, but mostly led by students and
phenomenon.

in Slovakia

gentsia and largely a reactive

intelli-

Nationalism, Panslavism, or Provincialism?

I

have referred

distinction
is

in this

review of the historical experience and

between movements limited to

a crucial differentiation in

nation

—

or whether

it

memory

of Slovaks to the

and those espoused by the masses.This
considering whether a movement is truly national
of the
elites

—

represents the nationalist feelings of a small and isolated group.

Walker Connor praises Rupert Emerson's definition of "nation" as "the largest community which, when the chips are down, effectively commands men's loyalty, overriding
the claims both of lesser
tially

enfold

it

within a

vak nation caught up

communities within

still

greater society." 39

and those which cut across it or potenTo what extent was the mass of the Slo-

it

in these defining events in their history?

collective national identity

move beyond

When

did any sense of

the realms of culture and language and reach
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the level of political

engagement? Were other group

orientations

dominant over the

national one?
I

have touched on these questions

in

reviewing the varying historical views of the

Two group

role of Slovaks in the events of 1848, 1939, 1944, and 1968.

appear

to

have been

among

or another

at

a large proportion of the

elites,

and particularly the

provincialism, underlain by an attitude of resignation,

among

the

intelligentsia,

Slovak nation

that of the

— most commonly,
— while showing

most with

Slovak

their social class

—
— and

Czechoslovakia

this century, to

while the Slovak masses have identified primarily with their local region or town
at

and

mass of the popula-

words, Slovak leaders have tended to look to a unit of identification be-

tion. In other

yond

orientations

play throughout these developments: panslavism of one degree

limited interest in events in the wider

territory.

The main

of the Slovak rebellion in

political leaders

been involved

key figure among them was L'udovit
language as

1

848 were individuals who had

promoting a homogeneous Slovak language and

in

Stur,

who

is

literary culture.

The

credited with codifying the Slovak

today. In frustration at his abortive efforts to galvanize the Slovak

it is

"How many,

people into action against the Hungarians, Stur complained,

even among

our youth, have as yet woken up!! At most a small number, scattered and spread about

who

here and there,

whom

don't even

know

they should prepare to serve."

which nation they should attach themselves,
Peter Brock notes that, in the last quarter of the

to

40

nineteenth century, "the small nationalist intelligentsia succeeded in maintaining itself
.

.

.

only with great difficulty.

It

was unable

to prevent the increasing denationalization

among the peasant
masses." 41 In her 1963 short story, " Tapakovci," Bozena Slancikova-Timrava uses her
of the younger generation

tale

.

.

.

and

it

exercised scarcely any influence

of the Tapak family as a thinly veiled parody of the Slovak people. The family lives

in a small village, with siblings
ily resists

any

change the

move by

status

quo

I'la,

in

and

their

wives

all

squeezed into one cottage. The fam-

the wife of the oldest brother, to build a

any way.

It is

from

this story that

I

draw the

new house

or

telling quotation at

the opening of this article, portraying an ingrained laziness and resigned contentment

among

the family

members. Later

in the story, I'la

bemoans

the fact that her

husband

does not even come after her when she leaves the house and takes up a living as the
servant of the local landlords in an attempt to shake

Timrava

knows what

writes, "[I'la]

him out of his complacency.

the Tapaks are like

—

that they

into everything, that they are as unshifting as a lead weight."
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have

Echoes of

to

be pressured

Stur's real-life

1848 resound in these lines.
Kirschbaum looks to the historic experience of Slovaks under Hungarian rule for an
explanation of these character traits and of traditional Slovak attitudes toward authority.
frustrations in

The Magyar

social

and

political

system had inculcated in the population an attitude

of deference toward authority and respect for social rank. As a personal mechanism
for the preservation of language

way of handling

successful

however,

it

and national

identity, this attitude

was not an un-

external pressure; as a collective pattern of behavior,

bred passivity, resignation, suspicion, and almost always also opposi-

tion.

The

opposition, such as

lence. Tatiana

it

would manifest

itself,

Repkova, a prominent Slovak

characteristics, particularly the habit of

lent in Slovak society.

was never characterized by mass

journalist,

obedience

43
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vio-

emphasizes that these Slovak

to strong leadership, are

still

preva-
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Transnationalism of the Elites
the turn of the century, while the masses seemed not yet to have extended their hori-

By

zons beyond their local environs, the intelligentsia were seeking support in the wider
realm of Central and Eastern Europe

among

other Slavic peoples.

Safarik,

were among a number of

literary figures

who

As

already noted, the

notably Jan Kollar and Pavel

leading Slovak individuals in the mid-nineteenth century,

took up the political banner.

Their panslavic and particularly their pro-Czech orientation was reflected in their

liter-

ary and linguistic, as well as in their political, endeavors. Both Kollar and Safarik wrote

Czech and did not support the formation of a separate Slovak written language, parowing to the range of dialects from which one would have to select. Rather, they
sought to develop a Czechoslovak language accessible to both peoples. Although it took
slightly longer for Czechoslovakism to become an accepted political doctrine among
the intelligentsia, its cultural, linguistic roots were already apparent.

in

tially

As

I

have outlined,

it

was

and of the post-World War

vak Republic. Even the founding of the "independent" Slovak
affair

who collaboTwo Czechoslo-

essentially a handful of Slovak intellectuals

rated in the formation of the First Republic

state

under Tiso was the

of a small political group which, despite their exclusively Slovak nationalist

much popular support. It was still Czechoslovakism,
among the intelligentsia. Many of them moved to or fre-

agenda, did not appear to enjoy

however, that predominated

quently visited Prague and strongly advocated the notion of brotherhood between the

two peoples. That

nomic and

is

not to say that they were ignorant of or unconcerned by the eco-

political subordination

gested that

full

of Slovaks within the

autonomy and even

vocally for greater rights of

state.

independence should be a goal. The increasing

the rights of Slovaks within the joint state culminated in the
as a priority over democratization during the

echoed

in the

document

They strove ever more

for a federal structure, but never sug-

poor

level of support

that called for

among

stress that

demands

many

laid

on

for federalization

Prague Spring of 1968. This

is

further

the Slovak intelligentsia for Charter 77, a

democratic rights but paid

attention to Slovak national

little

concerns.

Yet even these leading figures
cerns after the

who became more

Second World War often seemed

focused on Slovak national con-

to fall into resignation

and

passivity.

Kirschbaum declares,
There were no organized

political groups, but there

were people who were patiently

waiting for change: "The men, and, of course, also the

women, of

the year 1968

were certainly not organized as a movement, nor even half organized as the chartists,

knew one

but they

another. ... In contrast to the chartist dissidents, these

Slovak reformers concentrated on their

own

country

.

.

.

they were prepared for

changes, awaited them, and tried to be ready for them."44

This approach of passive patience might not seem unreasonable given the nature of

which the society was living. However, it stands out in contrast with
Czech chartists and of the Polish Solidarity movement.
Dusan Kovac wrote in 1991, "Historically, the entire Czech nation was prepared to

the regime under

the activism both of the

accept the theory of Czechoslovakism.
this

theory even

point.

For

all

that

The Slovak nation

[on the other hand] rejected

were Slovak Czechoslovaks." 45 Kovac" overlooks an important
the Slovak Czechoslovaks of the elite may not have mirrored a similar

if

there

pro-Czech orientation among the masses, it is not at allclear that the popular sentiment
was one of animosity toward the Czechs and the joint state. It is noteworthy that most
of those individuals elevated to the rank of hero in the
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modern Slovak consciousness

KovaC disparages. Stiir, the father of the Slovak
was a proponent of panslavism and author of Das Slawenthum und
die Welt {Slavdom and the World) in 1853. Kollar and Safarfk, as noted, were also
were, in

fact,

the Czechoslovaks that

literary language,

panslavic in their political views and favored the development of an integrated Czecho-

slovak language. Stefanfk, whose

memory

so

many tried to undermine in the Slovak
down the generations and a central part

national consciousness, remains a legend passed

of Slovak history for his role in forming the First Republic. Hlinka and Hodza, two
further national heroes, signed the Martin Declaration of 1918 supporting Czecho-Slo-

vak federation (although Hlinka's views were soon
cantly, there is

Dubcek. As Steiner points

to change). Finally,

and most

signifi-

out,

The roles of the successive First Secretaries of the Czechoslovak Communist Party,
Dubcek and Husak, in fact provide one of the many paradoxes of recent Czechoslovak political life. Both of them are Slovaks, but Dubcek was always regarded more
as a Communist than a Slovak. Husak, on the other hand, was always more of a
Slovak than a Communist
Yet it was Dubcek who came to appeal more to the
.

national

and

political

.

.

46
needs of Slovakia than the nationalist Husak.

It was Dubcek who led the move toward political, democratic liberalization and
Husak who pushed for federalization over, and ultimately at the expense of, democratization. Yet it is Dubcek whose memory is venerated to this day.
Not only have the leading Slovak Czechoslovaks remained entrenched in the historical consciousness of the Slovak people, but many of them also became Czech heroes by
dint of their dual role in forming the two joint republics. Hence these symbols of the

Slovak national heritage do not clearly distinguish the Slovaks from the Czechs, but
rather link them.

The "imagined community"

or "narrative of 'identity'" which

Benedict Anderson defines as the necessary foundation for a sense of brotherhood
the exclusive property of the Slovaks, but joins

them

inextricably with the Czechs.

is

not

47

The one prominent Slovak figure who is exclusive to the Slovak experience before
is Jozef Tiso. While Kirschbaum and Mikus defend his contribution to Slovak

1993

history and national development, the former acknowledges Liptak's observation that

"Tiso was metamorphosed from the position of a real historical person into the function
of a symbol." 48 Regardless of Mikus's wishful interpretations, the fact

is

that this

sym-

bol remains at best ambiguous and at worst deeply negative in the minds of the majority

of Slovak people. Forty years of Communist rule almost immediately following Tiso's
fall,

combined with worldwide condemnation of fascism, ensured that it was the uprisis, more widely perceived as the great

ing against the wartime regime that was, and

moment

in

Slovak history, not the achievement of independence under the aegis of that

regime.

Provincialism of the Masses: Politics
While there have been increasingly wide-ranging views and aims
cadre of Slovak politicians this century,
transnational goal that motivated
in the selective

memory

it is

many of

fair to

at a

the

growing

the influential Slovak leaders, those glorified

of the nation. However, as

of the mass of the people were set

among

say that Czechoslovakism was the

somewhat

we have

already seen, the horizons

different level

from those of

their

leaders.
I have noted the lack of enthusiasm with which the independent Slovak state of
1939-1945 was received by the people. The Slovak uprising of 1944 gained far more
popular support than the regime it rejected. Yet even this was almost entirely limited to

57

New England Journal of Public Policy

some

Central Slovakia and left large areas and
is

significant

urban centers untouched. One

community

reminded again of Emerson's definition of the nation as "the largest

which, when the chips are down, effectively
claims both of lesser communities within

commands men's

loyalty, overriding the

and those which cut across

it

it

or potentially

Beyond the few for whom loyalty to the
broader grouping of Czechoslovakia was the bottom line, the majority still seemed to
find their loyalties limited to regions within Slovakia and to more local concerns than
enfold

within a

it

still

greater society."
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those of the nation.

The events of 1968 suggest for the first time a strong emphasis on national goals.
The aims of Slovak leaders were divided: those in line with DubCek stressed liberalization and those in line with Husak demanded federalization as the priority. At the same
time, a significant proportion of the Slovak people seems to have raised their attentions
from local concerns
proportion of the

to this nationalist

agenda, actively falling in line with

unprecedented strength of feeling that reigned for a time

cal

among many members of her

community, reflecting both a wish for greater Slovak autonomyand broader

local

aims of

liberalization.

Yet

this

a

at least

time in Slovak history. Tatiana Repkova recalls the

elite for the first

politi-

period of relative national unify appears in retrospect

somewhat ephemeral.
The step of federalization opened the doors of government to many among the educated class who had taken up the protest against Pragocentrism. For them, the victory of
1969 was in winning access to jobs in the administration. As Donald Horowitz notes,
"There

hardly an ethnically divided state without

is

tial visibility

The events of 1968-1969

its 'civil

service issue'

essentially satisfied that elite's sense of

.

.

.

Differen-

deprivation." 50

compounds perceptions of

of various government bodies

group entitlement,

and they could furthermore reap the personal benefits that came with being part of a
system characterized by corruption.
Horowitz's argument, however, that "derivative prestige" or "symbolic satisfaction"
is felt

by the whole ethnic group once

its elite

gains access to government, falls short of

explaining the subsequent silence of the Slovak population.

was indeed

A

proportion of the Slovak

by the changes, dissolving the unity of voice they had briefly
maintained with the Slovak people. Only those among the elite who had no interest in
the reins of power were left frustrated. The mass of the Slovak people lost the political

elite

voice of

its

satisfied

1968 leadership,

much

they simply returned in traditional

of which now advocated the new status quo, and
manner to more provincial concerns. Repkova ex-

plains this as a feeling of resignation

doms and

lost,

among

those

who had

battled for political free-

and a subsequent return to passive obedience by those classes

who had

simply been carried along in the tide of their enthusiasm. Kusy goes further than this

when he

suggests that these events

pression they

felt

was not

awakened a

realization

among

Slovaks that the op-

in fact national, but a facet of the political system.

Federation did indeed bring us the end of the "oppression" of the nation, in

narrow interpretation; yet federation

.

.

bureaucratic machinations and the self-serving nature of the
leges, its incompetency, etc., persisted

nation, qualitatively

.

.

.

Federation, once

changed the optics of the nation's

had previously considered

to

its

did not resolve anything so long as the

.

power elite, its priviwas digested by the

it

sight: that

be specifically national oppression

power-political oppression, because the latter
veiled form. 51
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now

which

it

the nation

sees today as

presents itself in

its

pure, un-

Provincialism of the Masses: Territory
Kusy, as a Slovak who remained in Slovakia throughout

this volatile period, reflects at

length on the provincialism of the Slovak masses and challenges the notionthat they

form a cohesive nation.

In an essay written in 1981,

he

cites a

Slovak folk song extol-

ling the unity of the Slovak people.

The populism of this kind of national consciousness has, I believe, never existed
among us in the past, and still does not to this day. We are Detvanians, Maguranians and Upper Hronians, Zahorians. But a "Slovak race"? Only some enthused,
nation-oriented intellectual, a follower of Stur, driven by an idea that
the mentality of the

As evidence of
was born

Kusy notes

this provincialism,

by his or her regional

is

foreign to

52
Detvanian, could think up such a thing.

origins.

He

the Slovak habit of classifying a person

explains that he would avoid telling people that he

in Bratislava, as the capital

was not considered a place from which you came,

but rather a place you transited for various unavoidable reasons. Instead, he would offer
the birthplaces of his parents as possible categories.

He was

ultimately

dubbed a native

of Bobrovca, his father's birthplace, and adopted by the Bobrovcan "Mafia"

among

his

colleagues and contacts.

This desire for regional pigeon-holing continues today and
classes of Slovak society.

It is

illustrated in the

is

among

prevalent

all

remark by parliamentary deputy

Borovsky regarding the candidacy of deputy chairman of Parliament, Huska, for the
position of president.

He

told a reporter

Mr. Huska for his wisdom and

from the same region as

I."
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life

from the newspaper SME,

experience, and

I

also

"I personally value

admire him because he comes

In an article for The Slovak Spectator, Viliam

Schichman

extrapolates the feeling of regional differentiation and superiority that lingers behind

these words.

He remarks

that there are

two classes of Slovaks, primary Slovaks and

secondary Slovaks. "Primaries can be characterized as those living or coming from
Central Slovakia,

whose language was selected

as the 'backbone' of the nation

come mostly from
is

.

.

.

as the standard one,

who

see themselves

Secondary Slovaks, on the other hand,

the fringes of the country." 54

Schichman conveys how

live [in] or

this distinction

carried out in the political sphere.

The

ruling

and mostly "primary" [government] coalition appears

are an integral part of the nation with the right

on

the "conquered" fringe areas

and obligation

to believe that they

to enforce their will

and eliminate the influence of those they

Slovaks" (which does not always only

mean

call

"non-

Slovakia's ethnic Hungarians,

incidentally, but often also "secondary Slovaks") ... In contrast, the opposition

—

dominated by "secondary Slovaks," together with other ethnic minorities and a
relatively small following of

"primary Slovaks"

vision of the country, one based
for

much more

instincts

—

is

trying to realize a different

on principles of citizenship which would provide

inter-ethnic tolerance. This is clearly dictated

by

their

own

origins,

and experiences. 55

The sentiments

to which Schichman refers are evident in an article released by a progovernment organization, Committee 98, which launched itself recently on the Internet
as a movement in favor of a Central Slovak republic. By way of explanation, they write,

The Government Coalition is exposed daily
beats relentlessly on the drums of hatred of
evil-doers are towns

which were never

real

to pressure
all that is

from the opposition, which

Slovak.

The

nests of these

Slovak bastions. Jews, Hungarians,
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Germans, and other national groups were dominant
centuries.

It is

Bratislava or Kosice.

Slovakia.

Our proud

came from

forefathers

come from

the small villages of Central

56

These words represent an extremist version of a
illustrate the

and Kosice for

in Bratislava

not surprising that the great sons of our nation did not

common

viewpoint, and clearly

continuing regionalism within Slovakia that undermines a collective sense

of nation.

Provincialism of the Masses: Language
Kusy turns next to the question of the Slovak language as a key symbol of the alleged
unifying heritage of the Slovak people.

some nineteenth-century Slovak

I

have already touched on the movement among

who wished

intellectuals

L'udovit

vak

Stiir,

a political leader of the 1848 rebellion,

Kirschbaum

that is accepted today.

much

presented a challenge not so
dialects

from which a

literary

in

who

It

terms of the exercise

language would be created."

was ultimately

codified the version of Slo-

"The codification of

notes,

Czechoslo-

to cultivate a joint

vak language rather than create a unified, codified form of Slovak.

itself

He

.

the Slovak language

.

.

but in the choice of

identifies

two main

"lan-

guage integration areas": Central Slovak and Western Slovak. 57 This ignores altogether
the East Slovak dialects,

which remain hard

to understand,

many West-

even today, for

ern and Central Slovaks.

Kirschbaum and others vehemently
and
far

reject the notion of Slovak as a dialect of Czech,

What is significant, though, is
deeper root among the Czech people than
rightly so.

far as

comprehension

guage for Slovaks as

is

that the literary

concerned, Czech has

become almost a second common

well. After seventy years of joint statehood, both

vaks understand each other's formal language without
fact that

Czech

is

easier to understand for

own

varied dialects of their

On

form of Czech has taken

has literary Slovak in Slovakia. Indeed, as

difficulty.

many Slovaks

lan-

Czechs and Slo-

This leads to the ironic

than aresome of the

highly

still

people.

the one hand, then, there

is

a certain Czechoslovakism of language apparent in

Slovakia even today, since Czech can be understood and read by virtually the whole
population.

On

Our
still,

when one
Kusy writes:

factor.

provincial character
after

turns to the spoken language, regional dialects

the other hand,

remain the dominant

still

reveals itself fully in our language. Literary Slovak

almost a century and a

half,

overwhelmingly foreign

to our people.

foreign language for them, which they have to learn just as they

Esperanto

.

.

.

The

vast majority of our people don't learn

it

would have

is

It is

a

to learn

in their entire lives,

even despite the heroic efforts of teachers in schools, despite "correctly speaking"
newspapers, radio, and television, despite cinema and theater.

politicians, despite

Not only do they not learn
that they aren't able to

now

in

crets.

Tatiana

my

fifties,

I

am

do

it,

so.

they don't want to learn
I

do want

to,

and

surprised to find that

I

I

it

either,

and

I

would guess

sincerely struggle to do so, yet,

still

have not fully mastered

its

se-
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Repkova

tells

of the time she was

reaction she received from a

first

interviewed on television. The

number of viewers was how impressed

Slovak. They were used to the fact that being a native speaker did not mean
would speak a literary, correct form of the language.
In this respect, the

Slovak situation

is

initial

they were with her
that

one

not dissimilar to that in Germany, where re-

60

may even be hard for some Germans to understand, but
High German can be used as a common medium even by those who do not speak it as a
matter of course. The difference lies in the proportion of the population who can adjust
to this literary language form and the degree to which the population as a whole supports it as a part of their common culture and heritage. Kusy comments on the fact that
literary Slovak commands little respect among Slovaks and remains a formal method of
communication. "Anyone who wants to be 'of the people,' or 'national,' switches into
dialect. And since dialect can only be provincial in nature (we basically have no slang),
he or she becomes a provincial Slovak." Kusy extrapolates this further. "In the final
analysis," he writes, "the dominance of provincial language over common language is
in and of itself an expression, a reflection, of the dominance of provincial history over
gional dialects are varied and

common
ture."

history and, indeed, also of provincial, regional culture over

common

cul-
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Provincialism of the Masses: Culture
Kusy reports a discussion with the Slovak

Tomas

art historian

Straus in whichStraus

pointed out the historical nonsense of trying to insert the concept of Slovak

art into

was localized and was not adopted as
national until this century. Even to this day, the ceramics of Modra are known by the
name of that town, where they continue to be exclusively produced. The mountainous
Slovak history,

at least

before the 1920s. Folk

art

nature of the Slovak landscape doubtless helped to keep craft trades localized and isolated until transport

There
In

is

became

no doubt

easier and could link remote, rural communities.

that there exists a range of folk art that could be termed "Slovak."

some of its manifestations
from

little

that

produced

— embroidery, wood

carving, and so forth

Czech republic or Poland. However,

in the

it is

—

it

differs

considered by

the people as representative of their folk culture as a whole. Slovak dances and folk

songs are also considered to be part of a national Slovak culture. Folk
regional origins

come

a national currency.

who

writers
It

no

— often centered around
What

many

castles

lacking to this day are the

tales retain their

— but have be-

artists,

musicians, and

could represent a Slovak high culture.

stands out to a foreigner living in Slovakia that even on closer inspection there are

cultural figures of

world standing who might project an image of Slovakia

even an awareness of Slovakia
the

is still

the country's

—

into the international arena. There

Czech composers Smetana and Dvorak, no writer with

Havel.

As

is

—

or

no equivalent of

the stature of

the anthropologist Clifford Geertz points out, national identity

Kundera and
is

not just

about self-perception, but also about a sense of worth gained through the perceptions of
others.

"One aim

identity

is

to

be noticed:

it is

a search for an identity, and a

demand

be publicly acknowledged as having import, a social assertion of the

that the
self as

being 'somebody in the world.'" 60 Tatiana Repkova notes her

own experiences in
some Slovak souvenirs to give to friends in the United States that would
convey an image of Slovakia. She found herself limited to artifacts that reflected only
searching for

peasant

lifestyle,

such as figures

neric type, often not even

made

made from

corn husks, or products that were of a ge-

in Slovakia.

The only

alternative

was a compact

a

disc,

published overseas, of two Slovak opera singers. "The irony," she observes, "is that
these artists are hardly acknowledged by the Slovak public as Slovak national
In a world

the

where the Slovaks have always been

name of another

state, they sorely lack the

artists."

politically obscured behind or within

kind of recognizable representatives of

high culture that could project their identity in the world and raiseinternational
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awareness of their existence as a nation. Ironically, the quiet and bloodless nature of

Czech lands in 1993, while highly desirable as a mode of seproblem of obscurity in the international arena. If Slovakia is
gaining a higher profile within Europe it is for the notoriety of the Me iar government,
not for any positive image of cultural achievement, nor for her undeniable economic
Slovakia's split from the

cession,

compounded

this

successes.

Provincialism of the Masses: Religion
Catholicism

is

been the most

an important part of the

many Czechs adopted

of the majority of Slovaks.

life

salient point of distinction

It

has perhaps

between the Czechs and the Slovaks. While

movement, adherence

Protestantism via the medieval Hussite

to a

religious faith ceased to be a nationwide characteristic in the latter part of the nine-

Mikus states disparagingly, "Humanism, divorced from the supernatural
become the national philosophy of the Czech bourgeoisie. The worship of

teenth century.

element, has

and action, of the principle of spiritual and moral autonomy, of

liberty of thought

as the highest criterion of

Masaryk and BeneS

." 61

life,

Kusy

man

represent the very quintessence of the philosophy of

is

quick to note, in justification, that the Slovaks never

experienced the religious ups and downs to which the Czechs were subjected by the
Hussite revolutionary movement, the events of White Mountain, and the subsequent
forced recatholicization, which he sees as the cause of the Czechs' "lukewarm" ap-

proach

to religion.

For the Slovak leaders of the nineteenth century, religion did take on nationalist
overtones. Those
tion

who advocated

were largely Lutherans

a Czechoslovak language and even political coopera-

in the

Czech

When

tradition.

to Slovakia in the fourteenth century, they

Czech Hussite clergy went

the

took with them Bibles translated into Czech.

This written form of biblical Czech adopted, over time,

some Slovakisms.

A

number of

Lutherans in the eighteenth century strove to have this evolved biblical Czech formal-

was created

ized through study. Indeed, a chair of Czechoslovak language

at Protestant

schools in Bratislava and the mining center Banska Stiavnica.
It

was

shortly after the founding of the First Republic that Catholic Slovak leaders

such as Hlinka began to speak of religious discrimination from Prague. Those Slovaks
selected for government

were overwhelmingly Lutherans. Kirschbaum writes

the fifty-four representatives that Slovakia

Assembly

in late 1918]

.

.

.

there

was

that "of

allotted [on the RevolutionaryNational

were thirteen Czechs, thirty-one Slovak Lutherans,

and ten Slovak Catholics," despite the

fact that more than 75 percent of the population
was Roman or Greek Catholic. 62 It was Hlinka who later formed the Slovak People's
Party from which Tiso's wartime regime emerged. The nationalist rhetoric of this party

often referred to the Czechs as irreligious and tried to appeal to the Catholicism of the

Slovaks.

Despite these perceptions that Slovak Catholics were historically persecuted on

reli-

gious grounds, Kusy marks the beginning of concerted religious discrimination in the

postwar

era,

under communism.

He

concludes that

against Slovaks than Czechs "both because
the ideology

dominant

marks

it

was

it

was

and the representatives of the Slovak State

factor, and, as such, the

most

that religious repression of the

far

more widely

practiced

[the administration's] task to
.

.

.

purge

and because religion was a

significant ideological opponent." 63

Kusy

re-

Slovaks as a nation was the one issue that was not

alleviated with the federalization of the

Czechoslovak state in 1969. Slovaks undertook
annual pilgrimages to holy sites in Levo<5a and Sastin throughout the 1980s in a show of

62

And

resistance to repression.

in 1988,

300,000 of the 500,000 signatures on a Czecho-

slovak petition calling for greater religious freedoms were Slovak.

Religion would appear, then, to be the aspect of Slovak
tently united the population over time. This

is

seen by the nation as a group characteristic. While this

Repkova remarks
central role that

is

certainly true of the Poles,

saw the Poles as too religious and were struck by the
the church played in their everyday lives. Kirschbaum claims that the
that the Slovaks

"By

pilgrimages of the 1980s were in fact nationalist displays.
bringing people together of
also

became

has most consis-

life that

not to say, however, that Catholicism was

all

ages and from

nationalist demonstrations."
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For

their very nature of

parts of Slovakia, these pilgrimages

all
all

may be

that this

an apparent truth to

the outside observer, the question remains as to whether the people themselves
their

adherence

to religion in a nationalist light.

The evidence does not suggest

saw
that this

was the case. Indeed, there seems to have been a clear separation in the people's minds
between religion and the Slovak nation.
Repkova notes that those in politics who spoke the rhetoric of nationalism were, by
and large, not themselves religious, and when they tried to use religion for nationalist
purposes, it was with little effect. Kirschbaum relates a story from 1989 of how the
communist regime tried to link Catholicism and nationalism to the detrimentof both
through a television series called The Cross in the Shackles of Power. The aim of the
program was to suggest that the Catholic church had been responsible for the evils of
wartime Slovakia and also of the twenty years before

that.

This and similar attempts to

link symbols in the national consciousness appear to have failed: the people refused to
reject Catholicism as part

and parcel of the condemned wartime

Efforts to use religion for political purposes continue today.
visited Slovakia in 1997,

state.

When Pope John

Prime Minister Meclar decreed that the

visit

Paul

II

should not be

used for political ends. But posters featuring row upon row of Meciar's face alternating
with that of the pope went up overnight around the country. Yet the espousal of religion

by

seemed on

political figures has

the population. For

all

Slovaks than Czechs,

this

it

does not seem

tion to a specifically national issue, as
not,

and

is

weight with

have been reduced in the minds of the popula-

to
it

little

been stronger among

was by

the Poles to their north. In short,

it

was

not, a defining characteristic in the nation's self-perception.

The Growth

A

and other occasions to carry

that religious sentiment has historically

of

Group

Identity

Negative Identity?

One should

not ignore the fact that there was an undeniable increase in national con-

of the two Czechoslovak states.

sciousness during the

life

population and elites

came

We

closer together in their thinking

have seen

and activism

how

the Slovak

in the events

Was this new sense of common cause the result of a united
among Slovaks of who they were or simply an awareness of who they were not?

of 1968 than ever before.
feeling

As

I

noted

earlier,

Walker Connor draws

this distinction

nation according to whether a group's identity

is

between an ethnic group and a

a form of positive self-definition or of

negative rejection of foreign identities. Connor explicitly remarks on the negative na-

Hapsburg Empire. "The Slovaks, Croats, and
were neither German nor Magyar, long before they

ture of Slovak national identity under the

Slovenes

.

.

.

were aware

that they

possessed positive opinions concerning their ethnic or national identity."65
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would argue

that in the case of the Slovaks, this negative identity persisted under

Once

the Czechoslovak state.

disillusionment set in

—

for the elites through their lack

of political rights and for the masses in the economic stagnation and poor standard of
living

— the sense of resentment of Czech, or Czechoslovak dominance fueled a

of Slovak identity in contrast to Czech identity. The ease with which so many
the elite were co-opted into the regime and

corrupt ways, ways that did not

its

feeling

among
fulfill

the

professed religious or economic aims of the Slovak masses, suggests that their nationalist

rhetoric

had lacked

interested concerns.

positive, self-defining content

The speed with which

and was motivated by more

the population as a whole returned to

quiet resignation and provincialism suggests that the binding effects of

ment of

Czechs were a cohesive force only so long as

the

common

selfits

resent-

was fanned by

that resentment

the politicians.

Judy Batt sums up

this

continuing negative identity of the Slovak people, which has

been exacerbated by the inflammatory
The

politics of the

which emerges of the Slovaks

picture

one of a nation longing

become defined

to

Me

government.

iar

after the collapse of

be recognised in

its

own

right,

in opposition to the stronger, culturally

communism

whose

more

identity

is

.

.

.

had largely

sophisticated and self-

confident Czechs and Hungarians, and which was correspondingly marked by an
inferiority

ness."

But

complex and hypersensitivity
it

was a nation with

any insinuation about

to

its

"backward-

rather incoherent, only part-formed or deeply divided

orientations to politics, statehood and the substantive historical content of
tity.

its

iden-
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An Alternative

Czechoslovak Identity

In the end, the proponents of

Czechoslovakism comprise the group

had the most positive sense of

self-definition.

For

all that

the

that seems to have
Czech and Slovak lan-

guages were never united, they are entirely mutually comprehensible, and the Slovak

members of

this cadre were those who, if anyone, truly claimed literary Slovak as their
mother tongue. Their view of history was homogeneous and internally consistent: the
victories of Czechoslovakism were relatively unambiguous; the Slovak wartime state

was an

was a symbol of the desire for
The heroes of Czechs and Slovaks were the
same, mutual symbols of their common history. The Czechoslovak state was democratic
in its first incarnation, and its people struggled for democracy twice in its second incarnation, finally triumphing in 1989. This was a story that one could pass on with pride to
aberration; and the Slovak National Uprising

unification as well as a rejection of fascism.

one's children and grandchildren.

Emil Komarik, a Slovak
nation, in a
I

writer,

December 1990

summed up

the

power of

this

Czechoslovak group, or

article.

cannot escape the feeling that on the territory of the [Czecho-Slovak Federal

Republic] there are three nations: Czech, Slovak, and federal. In the republic, the

Czech and Slovak nations
is

are

more or

less tolerated, but the creator,

the federal nation. In numbers, the federal nation

entirely in

Prague but owns 70 percent of the

powers and has

all

the laws on

layer of rulers ... If there

ing up the republic,

it is

is

its side. It is

any

sort

is

owner and

state's property, has all the executive

a nation with only one layer but

of nationalism which

federal nationalism.
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ruler

not very big, lives just about

is

it is

a

truly capable of break-

1989-1993: Explaining the Dissolution

And so I turn to the final breakup of Czechoslovakia. Was Komarik's prediction true?
When the federal republic finally split in 1993, was it because the unacceptable dominance of the federalists defeated their own cause? Or was this the final maturation of
Slovak nationalism, the blooming of political, national consciousness? And why did the
dissolution come about so peacefully? Did this stem from a political maturity; from an
underlying sense of shared experience that

consequences of violence seen

in the

made

hostility unacceptable;

from fear of the

Yugoslav experience; or from something else en-

tirely?

The revolutionary thinkers and leaders of 1848 had been the
Kirschbaum writes,
The "Suirovci" had been
need

the
that

to define

is

and social workers as well as

its

and elevate the Slovak core as well as ensure

development elsewhere

of their time.

in Eastern

its
.

.

became

meant
the by-

Europe. 68

perhaps some truth in the observation that cultural figures

to violent protest than politicians of a different

politics,

survival,
.

As

political

This combination of culture and

less.

Slovak nationalism avoided the extreme manifestations that

product of

There

writers, poets,

would be no

leaders; their successors

literati

background.

What

may be
is

less inclined

also true

is

that

was but a handful of individuals among the Slovak population in 1 848 who were
prepared to translate the rhetoric of the leaders into action: the message did not strike a
there

chord among the Slovak nation,

or, at least, did not seem to them worth fighting for.
was once again democracy and not nationalism. As in
1848, Slovak artists and writers were prominent among the political forces that emerged
in Slovakia as communism crumbled. This time they were recognized as representative
voices by the now greatly increased proportion of students, professionals, and others
who filled the streets. As their nineteenth-century predecessors had been panslavists
seeking democratic rights under the Hungarians, so they were mostly Czechoslovakists
seeking democratic rights and freedom fromSoviet-led rule.
The 1992-1993 case is different. The artists and literati were never a part of the push
for independence from the Czechs; indeed many, if not most, opposed it. This, like the
creation of the wartime state, was a matter decided between a few politicians. Granted,
there was no vassal status to the new Slovakia that was created; but, equally, there was
no plebiscite, no referendum, no voice for the people in the formation of this new state.
It was handled by a political elite and engineered by the two prime ministers, Vaclav
Klaus and Vladimir Meciar. To an extent, Komarik might have been right in foreseeing
that Czechoslovakism would break up the federation, since the core dispute between
MeCiar and Klaus was the degree of autonomy to be granted to the Slovaks and the
rejection of what the Slovak government and others perceived as a history of Pragocentrism. While the Czech government wanted to continue with a federation of the two

In 1989, the issue at stake

nations,

its

Slovak counterpart

now

sought a confederal arrangement, including separate

international representation.

However, throughout the negotiations,

"No one

really

knew how

viable an option

it

support." 69 In 1991, a public opinion poll in

dents state their preference

among

independence remained the last option.
was and whether it truly enjoyed popular
the newspaper Smena asked that respon-

full

five options: a unitary state, a federal state, a union

of associated republics, confederation, and independence. Forty-two percent of Czechs
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voted for a unitary state and 28 percent for a federal

Slovaks voted for a unitary

state.

While only 1 1 percent of
state and 23 percent

34 percent voted for a federal

state,

for

mere 16 percent of Slovaks voted for independence. 70
Furthermore, it is widely acknowledged that had there been a referendum at the time of
the separation of the two states, a majority of both Czechs and Slovaks would have
a confederal

state. Significantly,

voted against

The

it.

final split

26, 1992,

a

between the two

and enacted on January

final fruition

agreed between the two premiers on August

states,
4,

1993, cannot objectively be considered to be the

of Slovak nationalist aims.

It

represented the allegedly nationalist aims of

a political group, of a government comprised of an ambitious premier at the head of the

HZDS

party and

its

coalition partner, the Slovak National Party.

some support among

the people, but

it

business community.

Repkova notes

that the final decision for

was

that of a minority

There was certainly

and came mostly from the
independence was driven

by the issue of privatization. Once Slovak politicians and businessmen realized that they
stood a

much

greater chance of getting hold of stateassets within an independent

Slovakia than in competition with Czechs within a joint

state, their

personal interests

drove the process of secession. Once again, a major change in Slovakia's political status

who

had been engineered by a few leaders

stood to gain personally, leaders

fessed nationalist motivations yet neither sought, nor paid heed

to,

who

pro-

the views and will of

the nation.

As

so often before, the nation accepted the

new system

were pleased, most of those who weren't adapted

Czech

to

it

as a fait accompli.

in resignation,

A

few

and the remainder

Arguments about the excessignificance to most
Slovaks for whom even Bratislava remains a distant and alien culture. The latest government of Vladimir Meciar, which has been in power since November 1 994, has centralized the Slovak administration in the hands of the government to an extent considerably beyond that of the years 1990-1993. Once again, the only concerted voices of
immigrated

to the

protest, apart

the

republic, Austria, or farther afield.

Pragocentrism of the previous federal system were of

sive

from the opposition

new nongovernmental

parties,

organizations.

have been the

They

little

artists, writers,

are the only ones to

and leaders of

have publicly dem-

onstrated against erosions of democracy.

Tatiana

Repkova

Slovaks remain,

everyday lives

believes that nothing has changed in the Slovak mentality.

at root,

"The

a peasant people," she says. "They are concerned with their

in their regions,

and

little

more. They

are,

by nature, an obedient people

who remain most

content under the guidance of a strong leader." She puts her

different attitudes

down

own

very

Her mother worked for the Bata shoe comcapitalist methods and focus on human resource de-

to her childhood.

pany, which was renowned for

velopment. She grew up with

its

Western culture of self-awareness and self-reliance,

this

which deeply influenced her and

left

her frustrated by the characteristic resignation and

passivity she observed around her. Like others in her position, she finally resolved that

there

was no other option but

to leave

Slovakia for the time being, a decision she did

not take lightly.

Ted Gurr, in his assessment of the factors that make ethnic violence a likely outcome
of tensions between groups, stresses the roles of group identity and a common sense of
grievance. "Grievances about differential treatment and the sense of group cultural
identity provide the essential bases for mobilization

by the group's leaders.
little

If

and shape the kinds of claims made

people's grievances and group identity are both weak, there

chance that they can be mobilized by any

66

political entrepreneurs in

response to

is

"

any external threat or opportunity." 71 There
identity and
lics.

common

no doubtthat the Slovaks' sense of group
life of the two Czechoslovak repub-

is

grievance increased over the

Yet when the new federal arrangement of 1969, imposed from without, gave many

of the nationalist voices a stake

government and

in

left

the rest of the nation with a

continuation of the status quo ante, the Slovak nation once again became, in Kusy's

words, "self-absorbed." If one accepts the argument that the uprising of 1944 cannot
rightly be classified as a national

movement,

either in the geographical extent of the

population involved or in the nature of the motivations

been no instance
identity

and grievances behind a common, national cause. There

leaders have been there.

ment

that

It is

of almost
its

appears to have

is

no doubt

that the

the strength and extent of national and nationalist senti-

have been lacking.

Gurr also concludes from
erned

at play, there

Slovak history when leaders have successfully galvanized group

in

his study of ethnic

autonomy demands

all

own

affairs."

72

is

In order to

common denominator

groups that "the

the historical fact or belief that the group once gov-

make allowance

for the

Slovak experience,

statement should perhaps reflect a requirement that the collective

pendence be a

positive,

happy one. Slovak

calls for greater

memory

this

of this inde-

autonomy, as espoused by

may have been promoted by the historical experience of
may have been independent of it. What is significant is that this call for

the wider population in 1968,

statehood or

autonomy was not a call for independence in 1968 nor was it a call for independence in
1992. The Slovak collective memory of the wartime experience is a necessary part of
any explanation of

this fact, as is the

continuing provincialism and passivism of the

Slovak national character.

smooth separation of the Czechs and Slovaks in 1992-1993 was not
management of virulent nationalist sentiment but the
repetition of a pattern in Slovak history: a political elite made a decision based on its
nationalist agenda without reference to the people, and the majority of the nation was in
It is

clear that the

the result of clever political

turn ready to accept the formula presented to

The debate on
to the

them and focus on

their local concerns.

was witness

separation within Slovakia, perhaps greater than ever before,

growth of

politically conscious sectors in

politically conscious

groups

—

Slovak society. The irony

students, intelligentsia, professionals

is

that these

— were

the most

dubious about the prospect of independence, while support for the nationalist agenda of

Me&ar's

HZDS

and the National Party was thickest

in the rural

communities of

Slovakia.

Strong leadership was once again the panacea that the worker and peasant communities desired,

but this time they found

it

among

their

own number. On doing

response was once again passive obedience, even after

began
an

to

be called into question. As Pavol

article for

who

is

Mevciar's

Sliac, a priest in Central Slovakia,

The Slovak Spectator, "Slovakia's leader

is

wrote

in

man
and who

a charismatic, talented

deeply sensitive to the profound but capricious moods of the masses,

able to satisfy their yearning for a father figure of divine stature.
It is

so, their

democratic credentials

is
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the nationalist rhetoric of Meciar's government that has continued to convince

the outside world that Slovakia's bid for independence can be equated with that of the

Balkan and Baltic

and repression of

states.
its

The new Slovakia has developed an image of rife nationalism

Hungarian minority. The

reality is that this is the rhetoric

67

of a few

New England Journal of Public Policy

who have found

leaders

a niche in certain sections of society for a negative definition of

While Slovaks along the Hungarian and Czech borders live in
Hungarian and Czech neighbors, the politicians appeal to
constituents far from these regions with their often xenophobic pronouncements of
Slovak distinctiveness and superiority. The irony is that these views have gained promiSlovak national

harmony with

relative

nence as a

So

identity.

political

their

platform largely after Slovak independence.

return to the path that

I

Walker Connor

ethnic group's sense of identity

a foreign element than by a
his followers

defined

is

common

would indeed appear

traces

more by

sense of

self,

be more akin

to

sents a step in the process of nation-formation,

it

from ethnic group

to nation. If

a sense of solidarity

when

an

faced with

then the nationalism of Meciar and
to

xenophobia. Yet even

testifies that

this "repre-

a group of people must

what they are not before they know what they are?' 74 Slovak nationalism may not form an easy model for other nations seeking independence, but neither is
it a mere mirage.
The reality is that what could grow to be a benign nationalism in Slovakia, a posi-

know

ethnically

tive, self-defined

sense of

common

identity, is

the government's rhetoric, often criticize
that

same regime. As Judy Batt

interested than those of the
are

committed

ideal of

it,

being built by those

notes, the parties in opposition to

Meciar camp

to finding a definition of

in

who

largely reject

and are labeled bad Slovaks and
promoting Slovak

identity, but rather they

Slovak identity that can becompatible with the

modern European statehood, and can

thus be realized in

harmony with 'Euro-

pean norms,' rather than challenging them." 75 The tragedy for Slovakia will be
second experience of independence, should turn out as tarnished as the
Slovak nation misses

autonomy and

this historic opportunity

democracy

true

at

by

traitors

Meciar are not "less

first

if this, its

so that the

of proving that Slovakia can have

full

one and the same time and create a proud and unified

legacy for future generations.

Epilogue
Slovakia held
MeCiar's-

its

HZDS

second national elections since independence in September 1998.
party

won

by a narrow margin, 27
The key
gained just 9.07 percent, and the

the largest proportion of the vote

percent, barely beating the Slovak Democratic Coalition vote of 26.33 percent.
coalition partner of

HZDS,

the Slovak National Party,

Union of Slovak Workers (ZRS)

fell

well below the 5 percent

minimum with just

1.2

percent.

The Party of

the Democratic Left,

which garnered 14.66 percent, soon confirmed

preelection pledge not to join a coalition with

HZDS

and SNS, making

it

its

impossible for

Me<5iar to form a government. Although he persisted in his efforts to forge a coalition

up

until the

seat of

October deadline,

power was

to introduce

all that

some

the incumbents could achieve before leaving the

last-minute controversial measures, such as dis-

patching various cronies as ambassadors to unfilled posts and privatizing parts of state-

owned companies

to undeclared individuals.
October 29, the opposition parties
Slovak Democratic Coalition, Party of the
Democratic Left, Slovak Hungarian Coalition, and Party of Civic Understanding

—

On

—

signed a coalition agreement. Together they hold 93 of the 150 seats in Parliament, a
constitutional majority.
sition, all

would

Given the democratic credentials of these parties while in opposeem well. But a number of possible pitfalls lie on the

at first sight

route ahead.

68

Some

new government have

of the parties and individuals that comprise the

perfect records themselves. There are

many

less than

reports of cronyism in the privatization

ill-fated "interim government" of March to September 1994, of
which some of them were members. There has been much talk of reviewing and resubmitting some of the privatization undertaken by the Me£iar government, which will risk
deep disruption in the economy and cause a rift between government and industry that
the former can ill afford. The Slovak Spectator has already warned against a perceived

undertaken by the

tendency among some

and

to

A

in the

condemn those who

new government

to give access to

compliant journalists

report on them critically.

danger is that the coalition will crack under the strain of political differEven when in opposition, these parties seemed almost incapable of acting in
concert on important and fundamental issues. When they were in complete agreement
on the need to move to direct elections for the presidency, rather than the present parliamentary vote, they were so focused on a difference of opinion in the detail that they
submitted two separate bills to Parliament and lost any chance of carrying the vote.
Should such divisions again dominate policymaking, these parties will soon find themselves stymied as a government and increasingly discredited. This would make all the
further

ences.

more

likely a

premature return

swing of votes back

to the polls, bringing with

it

a strong possibility of a

to the strong, yet less democratic, leadership

we have

seen since

1994.

The challenge
this article: to

in Slovakia

to the

new government remains

which

I

identified in the
to

work

in

body of

combination

and can win the confidence of the population. Although prospects look

when I wrote this piece,
be expected for some time. **

the jury

The views

should

rosier than

I

that

prove that autonomy and democracy can be made

expressed

in this article

is still out,

in

and the

final verdict

should not

no way be taken as the views of the

Brit-

ish Foreign Office.
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